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CHAPTER 3




Digitalization is a “Faustian bargain” for the state (Owen 2015, 15). On the 
one hand, it lends a promise to raise the efficiency of public administration by 
increasing the speed of bureaucratic processes and decreasing their cost. On 
the other hand, it poses a challenge to preserving the power, authority and 
control, threatening the public system to be “disrupted” by the new actors 
who previously had a limited opportunity to participate in public policy. For 
the government, exploring new forms of governance that relies on new 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is arguably a way to 
navigate this bargain. As a result, in late-1990s, a new concept—electronic 
government or simply e-Government—became prominent on the agenda of 
government reformers (Heeks, R., and S. Bailur. 2007).
According to Layne and Lee (2001, 123), e-Government is “government’s 
use of technology, particularly web-based Internet applications to enhance the 
access to and delivery of government information and service to citizens, busi-
ness partners, employees, other agencies, and government entities.” 
E-government borrowed heavily from applications and managerial approaches 
that originated in the private sector (Systems, Applications, and Products 
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[SAP], enterprise resource planning, portfolio analysis, and the like). This reli-
ance on private-sector, market-based techniques provoked conversations that 
e-Government is a digitally enhanced version of the “new public management” 
(NPM), an ideology and a number of more and less successful reforms that 
were implemented across the world in pursuit of greater government efficiency, 
the reduction of cost of public administration and improvement of public ser-
vices by making the public sector more businesslike (Homburg 2004). Other 
scholars considered “digital era governance” as a reaction (“course- correction”) 
to the new public management through the re-integration of processes and 
functions disintegrated in the course of NPM reforms (Dunleavy et al. 2006). 
ICT is, in short, an option for the government to remain in control while low-
ering the cost of bureaucratic government.
This chapter traces the development of e-Government in Russia from 2002 
to 2020 through the lens of public administration reform. Whereas in many 
countries digitization of the public sphere was implemented on an already 
developed and properly functional government apparatus, in Russia both 
reform projects coexisted for quite some time. The public administration 
reform (2003–2013), led by the Ministry for Economic Development (then 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), at its early stages was pri-
marily focused on developing a new vertically integrated government infra-
structure, reducing the burden of administrative redtape and over-regulation as 
well as streamlining the bureaucratic modus operandi. At the early stages, it was 
more intertwined with the civil service reform, controlled by the Presidential 
Administration, than with the initiatives in the sphere of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) that were championed by the Ministry 
for Communication (then Ministry for Communication and Mass Media). The 
overlap between the two major reforms created internal tensions that affected 
e-Government development trajectory. As a result, in the context of digitiza-
tion and global e-Government development, the Russian case appears to be a 
peculiar instance.
Since its inception, the dynamics in e-Government development in Russia 
has been fluctuating (Zherebtsov 2019, 603). Only in 2012 the outcomes of 
activities pursued by the government became detectable, with Russia improv-
ing its United Nations (UN) e-Government ranking to place 27, having started 
at 58th place in 2003, and improving its eParticipation index for the same 
period from 0.05 to 0.65 (https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb). 
After 2012, the development stagnated again. By 2016, the progress of 
e- Government included user-facing advancements (such as implementation of 
the Multi-Function Centers and a Unified Portal for public services (www.
gosuslugi.ru), as well as introducing common services online such as identifica-
tion, authentication, and payments systems) and “back office” solutions (set-
ting up infrastructure to link different government institutions and establishing 
national databases) (Petrov et  al. 2016, 5). Yet, the citizen uptake of many 
electronic services remained slow, some legislative changes were missing, and a 
significant part of the “back office” remained analogue (Petrov et al. 2016). 
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Despite the ambitious plans and strategies, the implementation of e- Government 
in Russia still lags behind most of the European countries. We argue that the 
level of implementation fell short of projected goals because of the resistance 
of the incumbent public administration system, but also due to the discrepancy 
of e-Government ideas and ideals between the members of the governing elite.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we introduce general considerations 
on the digital transformation of government. Next, we discuss the stages of 
e-Government unfolding in Russia, paying attention to both progress and 
problems. We mainly discuss the federal reforms, allocating only brief remarks 
to the regional and local dimension of the process. The conclusion provides an 
assessment of the past e-Government reforms and an outlook for the near future.
3.2  dIgItalIzatIon and government—Why and hoW?
3.2.1  Motivations for e-Government Uptake
Garson (2006) put forward four theories to analyze the uptake of digital tech-
nology by the governments. First, technological determinism postulates that 
technology is a way (or even the way) of achieving change. It sees technology 
as an unstoppable force to which everyone, including governments, has to 
adapt. Second, the reinforcement theory suggests that technology tends to 
reinforce the existing power structure. ICT has no “magic powers,” but it is a 
tool of control and domination that governments can deploy to maintain their 
authoritative position. Third, the systems theory assumes that while technol-
ogy does not prescribe change, it is the main force that enables change. ICTs 
can be used to integrate organizations, to achieve higher levels of efficiency, to 
improve performance, and this motivates governments to deploy them. Finally, 
the sociotechnical theory suggests that human factors determine the outcomes 
of technological change. ICT can be developed to support centralization or 
decentralization, democracy or autocracy, hierarchy or networks, depending on 
the design choices made by whoever develops and implements the system. 
Following the recent advances in sociotechnical change theorizing, we suggest 
that any technology is not implemented in a vacuum but rather embedded in a 
sociopolitical context and that individual practices and perceptions are indica-
tive of the contextual sociotechnical change. Thus, the uptake and functioning 
of digital technology in public administration will depend on the (political) 
context upon which this technology is superimposed.
In the context of non-democratic political regimes, a further theory of gov-
ernment digitalization has been proposed. Maerz (2016), bridging the rein-
forcement and the sociotechnical theories, has argued that e-Government is 
used by competitive authoritarian regimes, such as Russia or Kazakhstan, as a 
tool for gaining internal legitimacy. She suggested that e-Government allows 
to “simulate” transparency and participation, offering the citizens a number of 
services and engagement opportunities which, nevertheless, remain a façade 
covering the authoritarian core. The study concluded that e-Government 
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facilities shall not be viewed as a sign of democratization, but rather a tool of 
legitimation that helps preserving authoritarianism. Examining the Chinese 
example, Ma et  al. (2005) argued that e-Government can simultaneously 
strengthen administrative control and promote economic development with-
out empowering individual citizens in a democratic sense. In addition, con-
cerns have been raised with regard to privacy and data protection practices that 
accompany digitalization of non-democratic states (Seifert and Chung 2009). 
Greitens (2013) suggested that “authoritarianism online” rests on three build-
ing blocks: control over the online content, citizen surveillance via online 
tracking, and the promotion of regime goals through various internet applica-
tions. E-Government features prominently in both surveillance and regime 
promotion, making it valuable in an authoritarian context (Stier 2015). 
Summing up, there is a potential complex of motivations to adopt e- Government, 
and those have been decoupled from the early “democratizing” perspectives.
3.2.2  Stages of e-Government Development
Layne and Lee (2001) put forward four stages of a growth model for 
e- Government: (1) cataloguing, (2) transaction, (3) vertical integration, and 
(4) horizontal integration. The first stage starts when a government opens 
simple websites that tell about the government, its structure, and functions. 
Next, the experimentation of public sector with digital tools proceeds to trans-
actions, an interaction model where the user (citizen) interacts with the gov-
ernment via an electronic interface (service portal on a government website or 
mobile application) to receive public services ranging from a healthcare 
appointment to filing a tax declaration or registering a marriage. Government 
remains a service provider for citizens and businesses, but their interaction is 
“virtual” and online rather than in-person. The third stage is marked by deeper 
cooperation between various government departments. Different levels of gov-
ernment are also integrated, so that a citizen can contact one governmental 
body and complete any level of governmental transaction, often referred to as 
a “one-stop shopping”-public service provision.
The fourth stage of government digitalization is often connected to the idea 
of “government-as-a-platform” (GaaP). The concept of GaaP was coined by 
Tim O’Reilly (2011), a US (United States) based author, futurist, and entre-
preneur, who envisioned significant benefits from shifting from “state as a pro-
vider” to “state as an enabler” of services. GaaP, which differs from previous 
e-Government initiatives in that the core digital infrastructure is shared between 
public and private sectors, is not a “platform for government,” but a platform 
for governance, where government is one of the participants, service producers, 
and innovators. A similar idea has been presented by Linders (2012) as “we- 
governance” and by Janssen and Estevez (2013) as “lean government”—gov-
ernment provides a platform on which stakeholders deliberate, while the public 
authorities retain their “orchestrating” functions. Another related concept, 
government 2.0 (analogous to web 2.0), was proposed by Taewoo Nam (2012) 
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who has been advocating for crowdsourcing, Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs), and “citizen hacking” as means to improve the democratic 
quality and efficiency of government.
GaaP can be seen as a new package of ideas imported to public sector from 
business management. This time, the intellectual roots are in the “disruption 
theory” originating from the work of Christensen et  al. (2015), which has 
become a mantra of Silicon Valley. Disruption stands for “a form of libertarian-
ism deeply rooted in the technology sector, a sweeping ideology that goes well 
beyond the precept that technology can engage social problems to the belief 
that free market technology-entrepreneurialism should be left unhindered by 
the state” (Owen 2015, 7). The proponents of the concept emphasize its inter-
active character and the enabling potential (citizens as co-producers of public 
services) (O’Reilly 2011). Building new services from scratch means also that 
the old bureaucratic practices are not simply transferred into a digital form, but 
rather that procedures are renewed. The critics argue that the changing rela-
tionship between the state and society mediated by “big data,” software code 
and algorithms is a form of technocratic “solutionism” that effectively under-
mines democratic governance (Williamson 2016).
3.3  russIan government’s dIgItalIzatIon story
3.3.1  Towards an e-Government (2002–2009)
In the early 2000s Russia’s backwardness in the field of digital technologies was 
obvious to the new Russian leadership with the public sector demonstrating 
almost no signs of progress in this sphere. While global leaders were gradually 
transitioning to the new digitization agenda, Russia only had to conduct a full- 
fledged public sector reform. This prompted the reformers to launch both 
reforms simultaneously, yet independent from each other. Under the Federal 
Target Program (hereafter FTP), “Èlektronnaâ Rossiâ (2002–2010)” 
(Electronic Russia) e-Government was first developed as a separate reform. In 
its initial stage, the concept embraced a large agenda of democracy promotion, 
a significant modernization of the general ICT infrastructure, including its 
public sector component. The approach seemed reasonable as both required 
substantial development before they could be merged. The “Electronic Russia” 
program included a full spectrum of measures, necessary to build the complex 
government Information Technologies (IT) infrastructure. Particularly, the 
measures included the development of the systems of identification and authen-
tication as well as digital (paperless) workflow. In addition, the program pre-
scribed the development of solutions to integrate various independently built 
state information systems to ensure a complex services delivery through the 
multifunctional centers. Yet in the first years of the program implementation 
the only visible result of the reform was the increased Internet presence of the 
federal government bodies through a network of interconnected departmental 
websites. The actual building of the e-Government infrastructure had not 
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begun almost until the end of the program. Throughout its implementation 
the program was plagued by multiple drawbacks, including critical underfund-
ing, lack of coordination, inefficient use of budget funds as well as a compara-
tively low prioritization and insufficient political attention to the reform. Since 
its launch, the “Electronic Russia (2002–2010)” Program was revised at least 
five times, substantially narrowing down its scope and ambitious plans due to 
both, a very ambitious and loosely coordinated agenda as well as inefficiency of 
reform management and misappropriation of funds (Rudycheva 
2011, Polenova 2011).
Only by 2006, reformers managed to complete the development of key 
nodal elements of the government IT infrastructure of the government—State 
Automated (Information) Systems “Vybory” (Elections, http://www.cikrf. 
ru/gas/), “Pravosudie” (Justice, https://sudrf.ru/), “Zakonotvorčestvo” 
(Lawmaking, http://parlament.duma.gov.ru/), and “Upravlenie” 
(Administration, http://gasu.gov.ru/)—and proceed to designing elements 
of e-Government, particularly the Single Portal of State and Municipal Services 
(www.gosuslugi.ru), launched in 2010. These systems automate certain signifi-
cant political and administrative processes. Although being independent from 
one another and focused on specific tasks, these systems constitute the infor-
mation backbone of any electronic government and their successful launch and 
further utilization demonstrate a significant step forward in regard with digiti-
zation of the government sphere. The overall inefficiency of the program was 
acknowledged by both the country leadership and key experts. In order to 
increase the effectiveness of the Program, in 2008 the Ministry of 
Communications of Russia conducted a review of the implementation of the 
Program. According to the report, many of the objectives of the Program have 
not been achieved. In particular, interdepartmental electronic interaction was 
not actually realized. In addition, standardization of IT solutions was not 
widely used, leading to the situation when the created hardware and software 
systems were not used to their full potential due to the lack of systems 
interoperability.
In this regard, in 2009, the Program was restarted and complemented by 
the independent “Conception of e-Government development until 2010,” 
emphasizing the strategic priority of e-Government. This was an important 
shift towards the recognition of the leading role of IT solutions in the future 
modernization of the national public sector. This restart coincided with the 
beginning of the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev that was marked by several 
modernization efforts. During 2008, a legal review had been conducted and 
new federal laws prepared. On February 9, 2009, the Federal Law 8-FZ “Ob 
obespečenii dostupa k informacii o deâtel’nosti gosudarstvennyh organov i 
organov mestnogo samoupravleniâ” (On the access to information on the 
activity of the state and local authorities) has been issued, together with an 
Order of the Government of Russia №478 from June 15, 2009, “O edinoj 
sisteme informacionno-spravočnoj podderžki graždan i organizacij po voprosam 
vzaimodejstviâ s organami ispolnitel’noj vlasti i organami mestnogo 
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samoupravleniâ s ispol’zovaniem informacionnotelekommunikacionnoj seti 
Internet” (On the unified system of information and reference support of citi-
zens and organizations on questions concerning their cooperation with the 
state and local authorities by means of the Internet), and the Presidential 
Decree N721 from September 9, 2009, has brought changes into the FTP 
“Electronic Russia 2002–2010” to enable a unified technical infrastructure 
for the Russian e-Government. The evaluation of the program’s unsatisfac-
tory outcomes coincided with the substantial revision of the results of the 
Public Administration Reform. By 2010 it was obvious that the outlined 
reform agenda was exhausted. Like the “Electronic Russia 2002–2010” 
Program, the public administration reform also failed to implement and con-
solidate new principles of public administration, based on the NPM approach. 
The initial strategy to build a triple-layer structure of functionally segregated 
government agencies and thus ensure organizational diversification of the 
Russian public sector did not come to fruition. It was planned to assign the 
policy creation and implementation function to ministries, the control and 
oversight function—to state services, and services provision function—to 
state agencies, which would be politically and administratively independent 
from each other. Instead, the reform resulted in the creation of a vertically 
integrated system of government with the dominant top-down vector of 
bureaucratic accountability. Further modernization in this direction had come 
to a logical standstill and required the revision of the strategy.
3.3.2  Building e-Government (2011–2015)
After six years, the Public Administration Reform had been demonstrating lit-
tle evidence of improving the efficiency of the government and quality of pub-
lic service. The reform failed to achieve most of the measurable targets that 
were laid in it. By the same token, the FTP “Electronic Russia 2002–2010” 
was openly regarded as a failure. In these circumstances, it has become evident 
that the approach to separately implement both modernization projects had 
proven its inefficiency. For the third phase of the Public administration reform 
it was decided to put the development of Information and Communication 
Technologies in the core of the government modernization project. Thus, 
Russia joined a plethora of countries in conversing its public administration 
into e-Government. To ensure that a bigger picture is not missed, the 
e- Government reform was harmonized with another overarching Federal 
Program, “Informacionnoe obŝhestvo 2011–2020” (Information Society, 
Government Decree N 1815-r from October 20, 2010), which set as its key 
objective the digitization of all spheres of the Russian society.
The focus of the reform was made on conversing public services, internal 
workflow and data government into a digital format. In the minds of reform-
ers, e-Government would further extend the single-window access principle of 
public services delivery at the customer end through the united single portal of 
state and municipal services. The portal was aimed to provide information on 
3 E-GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA: PLANS, REALITY, AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
40
available services and government regulations, digital application forms, and 
payment services. To ensure access to multiple services from different federal, 
regional, and municipal government agencies, the portal should be integrated 
with the Unified Identification and Authentication System (Petrov et al. 2016, 
26). Such ambitious goals determined a complete reformatting of the govern-
ment IT back office.
The vector of further modernization was determined by the adoption in 
2010 of the Federal Law No. 210-FZ “Ob organizacii predostavleniiâ gosu-
darstvennyh i municipal’nyh uslug” (On the organization of delivery of state 
and municipal services), which de-jure prohibited government agencies from 
requesting the previously collected and stored personal information of appli-
cants. The clause made imperative interagency collaboration at least in the con-
test of services delivery. In junction with policies to enforce the promotion of 
digital workflow, the main focus of the back-end modernization shifted towards 
the SMÈV (Sistema mežvedomstvennogo èlektronnogo vzaimodejstviiâ, System 
for Electronic Interagency Collaboration). Initially, it was perceived as an IT 
solution connecting the EPGU (Edinyj portal gosudarstvennyh i municipal’nyh 
uslug, Unified Portal of State and Municipal services) with similar regional 
portals and multi-function centers, on the one hand, with services providers–
authorized government agencies, on the other. The functioning of the digital 
government infrastructure also prompted the development of the Unified 
System of Identification and Authentication in order to ensure proper user 
access. Finally, the approach included the synchronization of the system with 
the State Information Systems that were built in the previous period.
Thus, the next step in public administration reform was effectively con-
verted into building e-Government in Russia. Yet despite such significant shift 
in the agenda, the overall approach seemed to remain intact. As with the earlier 
reform, it was decided to focus on the infrastructure development projects with 
the implicit expectation that they would foster policy and operational changes. 
In addition, the approach replicated the earlier and already proven faulty expec-
tations that the infrastructural transformations will prompt the regions to catch 
up. The reformers assumed that regional government would take advantage of 
the developed infrastructure and utilize option of hosting its regional 
e- Government segments.
At the same time, reflecting on past experience, the decision was made to 
ensure a smooth transition to the predominantly online service delivery model. 
To ensure non-disruptive on-boarding, it was decided to enhance the function-
alities of the already built territorial multifunction citizen service centers, which 
were tasked with promoting and facilitating citizen’s use of the online portal. 
However, since the centers were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the 
Economic Development, this decision did not eliminate the dual administra-
tive control over the reform, which had plagued the reform process before. 
Under the new system, the division of authority over the reform was made as 
follows: the Ministry for Communication was predominantly tasked with the 
development of e-Government infrastructure and the Ministry for Economic 
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Development—with policy and oversight over the reform as well as the “off- 
line” on-boarding. This decision not only influenced the efficiency of coordi-
nation but also had a negative impact on the political capital necessary for 
the reform.
In designing the reform, key focus was made on developing normative stan-
dards, prescribing the reform’s end-points, and prioritizing infrastructure 
development over policy transformation. This allows defining the reformers’ 
approach as genuinely technocratic. Reformers refused to account to the exist-
ing capacity of the bureaucracy to influence implementation of the reform not 
only by slowing down its complicated and/or unfavorable aspects but also by 
resisting to certain policy proposals that undermine its control over certain 
policy domains. Following Pournelle’s famous Iron Law of Bureaucracy 
(Pournelle 2006), stating that in any organization some people work to further 
the organization’s goals, while others work for the organization itself, any evo-
lutionary attempts to reduce the size of public administration or level of con-
trol over certain areas through any means of improvement and optimization, 
including digitization, would face with the administrative actions to curtail and 
diminish their effectiveness. Coupled with the lack of precise measurable indi-
cators for the efficiency of the reform, the first reform was inadvertently set to 
demonstrate underperformance. Those implementation and performance indi-
cators, proposed in the documents, did not justify the selected targets. For 
example, implementation has confirmed that the chosen reform methods 
would not lead to the conversion of 70 percent of all state and municipal ser-
vices to the electronic format (Order of the Government No.2516-r, December 
25, 2013).
The implementation of the reform in 2011–2013 revealed the deficiencies 
of the initial reform sign, as it struggled to achieve the designated goals. Despite 
the positive dynamics and ever-growing number of registered online citizens 
and users, coupled with advanced and well-designed United Portal of State and 
Municipal Services, the overall impact of digitization did not meet expecta-
tions. Most popular and frequently used online services were purely informa-
tional (i.e. required further offline actions to proceed) and the majority of 
registered online users opted for the option of simplified registration that 
excluded enhanced user verification and authentication. Subsequently, this per-
mitted only limited access and functionality that, particularly, excluded the pro-
cessing of payments and other operations that required the substantive 
utilization of personal and financial data (for more details refer to 
Zherebtsov 2019).
From the operations perspective, the reformers failed to engage with regions, 
which in practice, resulted in the emergence of two parallel and often unsyn-
chronized systems of e-Government portals—for the federal services, on the 
one hand, and for regional and municipal services, on the other. Speaking of 
the EPGU exclusively, less than fifteen percent of federal and less than ten per-
cent of regional and municipal services were fully available electronically. The 
regular monitoring of regional e-Government development, conducted by the 
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Ministry for Economic Development revealed substantial discrepancy of the 
quality and quantity of services, available on regional portals. The reform 
implied the monopoly of the state-owned corporation, Rostelecom on provid-
ing hosting and infrastructure for e-Government. It was expected that regions 
would “rent” the provided infrastructure; yet the degree of compliance with 
this policy initiatives appeared to be low. Rich regions (such as Moscow, St. 
Petersburg) have already invested in the development of their own portals, and 
poor regions found the Rostelecom hosting prices too restrictive to use the 
infrastructure and realized that building local solutions is cheaper. Coupled 
with technical difficulties that affected the implementation of electronic work-
flow (for example, Internet bandwidth restricted access to regional databases 
and registries) that impacted the interagency collaboration, the first phase of 
e-Government reform in Russia was regarded inefficient.
As a result, substantial changes were made to the design of the reform. After 
conducting the inventory of existing services and analyzing users’ activities on 
the portal, the decision was made to focus on converting the most actively used 
services to a fully online format. The shift of focus from the extensive (quantity 
of services) to intensive (quality of services) development of the Portal was 
accompanied by the change from institution-oriented to user-oriented 
approach. Services, which were previously grouped by institutions, responsible 
for their delivery, started to be aggregated on the basis of user life situations, 
substantially improving the quality and user-friendliness of the portal.
Innovations, visible to the users, were supported by a considerable transfor-
mation of the government back-end functionality. In fact, the entire architec-
ture of e-Government was reconsidered in order to put SMÈV—System for 
Electronic Interagency Collaboration—into the core of the infrastructure. In 
terms of the architecture design, the initial “hardware-based” approach, 
focused on the digitization and webification of the already existing infrastruc-
ture and processes, was replaced with the “solution based” principle that 
focused on supporting IT solutions fostering intra-governmental communica-
tion and data exchange. Reformers refocused on the creation of system of key 
IT gateways around key components of e-Government in an attempt to unite 
and synchronize previously developed objects of government IT-infrastructure.
The “bumpy” road to e-Government was noticed and reflected in Russia’s 
standing in international e-Government ratings. The e-Government develop-
ment index, prepared by the United Nations on a biannual basis, marked a 
significant progress between 2010 and 2012, when Russia moved from 59th to 
the 27th place. Yet, between 2012 and 2016, Russia failed to improve its per-
formance, falling to the 35th position with very limited positive dynamics in 
the index itself, allowing other countries to move forward. The situations 
started to improve in 2018, when the country moved to the 32nd place with 
substantial increase of its index score. This decade-long dynamic correlates 
with the ups and downs in Russia’s e-Government development process.
The period between 2011 and 2016 was marked by moderate actual growth 
and propagation of e-Government services. According to the official statistics, 
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the total number of registered users demonstrated exponential growth from 
just over 3 million in 2012 to 13 million in 2014, to 40 million in 2016. 
However, a more critical analysis reveals a quite different situation. When these 
data are compared with official demographics from Rosstat in the period 
between 2012 and 2014, the number of users registered on the EPGU appears 
to be less than 12 percent of the total population, older than 18 years and less 
than 18 percent of active internet-users from the same age group. Moreover, at 
least one-third of all registered users opted for the simplified registration, thus 
not having full access to the portal. All this reduces the number of Portal users 
with full and unrestricted access to only 8.3 percent of Russian citizens and 
12.5 percent of internet-users.
As demonstrated by Hilov (2014), the reported data on activity dynamics 
was based on the number of submitted, not executed requests. According to 
the author, only 87% of the requests for federal services were executed and the 
numbers for regional and municipal were much lower—36% and 19% respec-
tively. Services delivery also differed substantially between the top ten regions 
averaging 167 requests per 1000 people compared with bottom ten having 
only 13.8 requested per 1000 people. In addition, the quantity of recipients of 
fully electronic services remained relatively low during the same period of time. 
Only about 3.2% of Russian citizens opted for this option in 2015, while others 
still used the walk-in option (Dobrolyubova and Alexandrov 2016). In 2013, 
63% of respondents did not interact with public authorities online because they 
“prefer a personal visit and personal contact” (Rosstat 2014).
In addition to the digitization of services, the e-Government reform pro-
claimed significant improvement of regulatory capacity of the public adminis-
tration, positively affecting the business climate. It was expected that converting 
to the digital format would reduce the administrative and regulatory burden 
on business, thus enhancing the business climate and fostering economic 
growth. Yet existing evidence demonstrates that the business community 
remained disengaged with the government, despite all improvements in the 
IT-infrastructure. The 2015 annual report of the office of the business ombuds-
man to the President (Doklad 2015) stated that the government failed to 
impose any significant changes with respect to the existing regulatory burden. 
Despite the positive feedback on the EPGU, almost 52% of respondents out-
lined in 2015 that administrative burden has been increasing, accounting for 
10 to 20 percent of the total company’s revenue. The business community 
indicated that the reform failed to streamline regulatory activities of the state 
agencies, as some still enforce regulations, the implementation of which would 
inevitably result in fines and other penalties.
It required a substantial review of the initial reform project in order for 
e-Government to catch up and become the leading form of public administra-
tion in Russia. The reform resulted in the creation of advanced and modern IT 
infrastructure of digital government with the most notable transformations 
occurring in the public services delivery aspect and particularly in the context 
of constant modernization of the EPGU.  In this regard, late start (in 
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comparison with the leading countries) leveled the negative consequences of 
the technocratic approach. In reality, the very approach contributed to the 
rapid modernization of the IT infrastructure, as it did not account for how the 
developed infrastructure would be utilized by the bureaucratic apparatus. 
Nevertheless, the reform process revealed substantial flaws in the reform design 
and implementation, whose persistence at the following stages have the poten-
tial to become a very detrimental factor.
3.3.3  Beyond the e-Government—Government as a Platform 
(2016–Now)
The FTP “Èlektronnoe pravitel’stvo” (Electronic Government) was concluded 
in 2016. The citizens gradually accepted the new form of interaction with 
regulators and bureaucrats, in particular young and middle-aged people found 
it convenient, and ever-growing Internet coverage (mobile first) made wider 
adoption possible  (Shipov 2016). As electronic public services started to 
become normalized all over Russia, the most recent iteration of public sector 
digitalization—Gosudarstvo kak platforma (government as a platform)—had 
been presented as a concept in April 2018. The concept has been under devel-
opment since 2016 at CSR (Centr strategičeskih razrabotok, Center for Strategic 
Research), a think-tank curated by Alexei Kudrin, former Finance Minister and 
the current head of the Russian Audit Chamber, belonging to the political 
group of “reformers.” The document outlines how O’Reilly’s concept could 
be transplanted into the Russian public administration. While it is not an offi-
cial governmental program or strategy, it is worth noting that the leading polit-
ical party “Edinaâ Rossiâ” (United Russia) has included GaaP into the program 
for the November 9, 2018, united election day in a few regions. While the idea 
is very new, it has already gained traction among the regional politicians and 
will most probably continue its way into the federal policy-making.
As discussed in Sect. 3.2.2, “government as a platform” is going a step fur-
ther in comparison to e-Government, suggesting innovation in service delivery 
by allowing third parties to re-think public services without the direct interven-
tion of authorities. The model for this is to provide application programming 
interfaces (APIs) to citizens and businesses who can innovate on the formats of 
service production and delivery. Hence, GaaP is “shifting services into new 
digital formats that will allow governments to continually gather huge reser-
voirs of data on citizens’ everyday activities, interactions and transactions—data 
that can then be mined, analyzed and used as insights to shape services—whilst 
simultaneously encouraging citizens to become responsible participants in the 
coproduction and provision of those digital services” (Williamson 2014). This 
set of ideas can be found in the CSR “Gosudarstvo kak platforma” concept 
paper (2018). The concept links to the Digital Economy of the Russian 
Federation program 2018–2024 that focuses on enhanced adoption of digital 
technologies in economic and social spheres (for more, see Lowry 2020).
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The justification of digital public administration is built around a number of 
explicit and implicit problem statements. First, it mentions lack of trust in state 
institutions. The lack of accountability and citizen control over public admin-
istration is regarded as a cause of inefficient bureaucracy. Corruption, mistakes, 
and heavy administrative burden are expected to be alleviated by GaaP. Second, 
lack of trustworthy data and ineffective, slow processes of data acquisition are 
considered to make the state slow to respond to various challenges. Authorities 
are presented as intermediaries between the citizens and their data who stall the 
efficiency and speed of public service delivery. The lack of horizontal, interde-
partmental integration is seen as a further challenge. The resistance of the 
incumbent public administration system leads to “digital feudalism,” meaning 
that each public body develops its own digital systems and processes that are 
not interoperable. The concept also criticizes the Multi-Function Centers and 
a Unified Service Portal, which were introduced as a part of the Electronic 
Government program, claiming that they were a tactical win that turned into a 
strategic loss, since they preserve the existing inefficient system and block fur-
ther development and genuinely new ways of public administration.
The CSR document is interesting because it presents GaaP as a solution to 
a number of problems in the current system of public administration. The con-
cept states that poor public service delivery is the reason for the lack of innova-
tion in Russian economy, while lack of reliable data and data analytics tools 
leads to suboptimal decision-making. The basic assumption is that the global 
competitiveness of a state is a direct consequence of the way the public admin-
istration is run, hence, introduction of GaaP is a way of ensuring Russia’s com-
petitiveness in the global arena.
However, even more revealing is the analysis of implicit problems through 
the analysis of expected benefits. The two key characteristics of GaaP are 
being human-oriented (čelovekoorientirovannyj), yet human-independent 
(čelovekonezavisimyj). These are suggesting that the current system is not ori-
ented towards the citizen but rather towards the state and its offices, while all 
the decisions are dependent on concrete public servants. The idea of auto-
mated, algorithmic, and big data-driven decision-making as fair, neutral, and 
citizen-oriented, emerges throughout the document. “Intellectual agents” 
(intellektual’nye agenty)—artificial intelligence (AI) driven decision-making 
algorithms—are expected to be at the core of public service. Bureaucratic pro-
cess and personal responsibility in decision-making—both seen as problems of 
the current system—would therefore be substituted by an algorithmic process 
that eliminates personal contact. As a consequence, most of the public servants 
will be IT professionals and machine-learning specialists.
What is different in the CSR concept compared to the models developed by 
O’Reilly and other “visionaries” is the state-centric and hierarchical nature of 
developing and governing the transition to GaaP. Unfolding of the architec-
ture, systems, and services is not simply curated by the state, but rather super-
vised. The state is the main developer and could involve third parties to develop 
additional services if it considers this necessary. There is only a marginal role for 
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the citizens who are re-conceptualized as users benefiting from the new 
GaaP.  Each citizen is expected to acquire a “digital twin”—a set of data—
already at birth and the amount of data constituting the digital representation 
of every person will grow with the time. The citizens therefore will be “data-
fied” (Hintz et  al. 2018). Yet, no systems for citizen participation in GaaP 
development and maintenance are proposed. The concept lacks any instru-
ments of accountability or citizen audit (for more on government data, see 
Chap. 22).
As a result, the problems outlined in the concept are not being addressed 
through deliberation or other forms of democratic participation, but automa-
tion and AI are taking the place of digital democracy. The word “democracy” 
(or its derivatives) does not emerge in the concept a single time. Focus on 
technology rather than democratic process is emblematic: the technocratic nar-
rative of information technology as a source of increased efficiency for the state 
has been a prevailing ideology of the ruling elite since 2012 when Medvedev’s 
techno-political modernization agenda was curtailed.
3.4  regIonal and local dImensIon of e-government
The federal government has been the main driver of e-Government reforms 
and the main changes have happened at the federal level. Yet, also at the 
regional and local level, there have been various digital initiatives. Kabanov and 
Sungurov (2016, 85) studied the uptake of e-Government in the Russian 
regions. They argue that “the diffusion of e-Government itself was to a large 
extent the result of a vertical influence of the federal government.” This is well 
illustrated through examining different facets of e-Government. In case of 
public procurement, the new procurement law (94-FZ) introduced at the fed-
eral level mandated the creation of transparent and available information access. 
As a result, all regional governments created portals to implement the law, even 
though almost a half have only done so to fulfill the formal requirements 
(McHenry and Pryamonosov 2010). In the case of e-Government payments, 
there has been no unified legal provisions on their installment, hence, signifi-
cant regional variation can be observed (McHenry and Borisov 2005). While 
today all the regional governments have Internet presence, the functionality of 
the websites differs considerably. Kabanov and Sungurov (2016) suggest that a 
more mature e-Government in a given region is a combination of several fac-
tors, including bureaucracy effectiveness, technological advancement, invest-
ment in ICT, and relatively democratic political regime. Techno-optimistic 
orientation of the regional governing elite, especially the governor, also seems 
to be important, at least judging from the cases of Sakha Republic (Yakutia, 
Ajsen Nikolaev), Moscow (Sergey Sobyanin), Belgorod oblast (Konstantin 
Poležaev), and so on.
Similar dynamics can be observed at the local level. While we have not 
observed relevant empirical studies in Russia, Johnson and Kolko (2010) com-
pared the nation-level and the city-level e-Government initiatives in Central 
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Asia, concluding that local-level initiatives are more citizen-oriented and trans-
parent. This probably is related to the fact that at the local level, governments 
are not mandated to develop electronic services or participation tools. A useful 
illustration is provided by the analysis of civic technology platforms, meaning 
digital platforms for citizen participation and engagement with the govern-
ment, conducted by one of the authors. Civic technology is usually realized as 
an online or mobile application that allows citizen participation in urban man-
agement, planning and design through consultations, opinion polling, ratings, 
requesting repair, complaints, participatory budgeting, and other similar 
engagement forms. For the government, civic technology can perform several 
functions, from creating a new communication channel to get instant input on 
the bureaucratic performance and respond to the daily needs of the citizens 
with improved services, to a scalable method for collecting and analyzing pop-
ular needs, preferences, ideas, and values. According to our estimation, about 
half of the Russian regional capital deployed civic technology platforms over 
the past five years (2014–2019).
3.5  concludIng remarks
This chapter traced the development of e-Government in Russia from 2002 to 
2020 through the lenses of public administration reform. During the first 
period—2002–2009—an FTP “Electronic Russia” was launched in parallel 
with a major administrative reform. While there has been an overlap between 
the two, both reforms failed to implement the principles of New Public 
Management (NPM) to an extent that would yield them success. The second 
period—2010–2015—can be identified within the scope of the next FTP 
“Information Society 2011–2020,” and particularly, its key project “Electronic 
Government (2011–2015).” This project departed from an idea of 
e- Government as a complement or partial substitute to the “real” government 
and focused on the development of infrastructure for electronic public service 
delivery. Finally, the third period—2016–present—started the development of 
“government-as-a-platform” concept, that has so far not been implemented 
but raised much interest among various actors, as well as provoked debates 
regarding the future of data and digital infrastructures for its collection, pro-
cessing, and storage.
These developments were aimed at serving several goals. The first aim was 
to improve the efficiency and decrease the cost of public administration, two 
central ideas of the NPM agenda. The projects cannot be regarded as pure 
“window-dressing,” as much of what has been achieved, in particular in the 
area of electronic service delivery, has had a positive effect on citizen–state 
interactions. In simple terms, for an average citizen in a non-conflictual situa-
tion, it has become more convenient, quick, and simple to communicate with 
government authorities. The e-Government project also had a pronounced 
political economy aspect as one of its goals has been to secure the country’s 
competitiveness internationally, appearing as a more attractive location to both 
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live and do business. Yet, the intentions did not match the reality and busi-
nesses noticed an increased administrative burden as a result of the innovations. 
Eventually, while driven by “good intentions,” the discrepancy between the 
plans and their implementation appeared large.
The review of the near two decades of digitalization of the public sector in 
Russia, performed through three consecutive federal programs/concepts, 
reveals an authentic style of conducting such reforms that can, at least partially, 
explain the observed discrepancy. First of all, there is a highly pronounced 
technocratism of planning and preparing the reform designs. Unlike in most 
democratic countries, e-Government reforms were designed with the state, 
rather than the citizen, at the center. Such unique style of the reforms can be 
regarded beneficial only for vast infrastructure-building projects, when it is 
important to enhance control over multifaceted implementation tasks in order 
to ensure a more or less balanced development of all components of the digital 
government infrastructure. Yet it seems that adhering to the same strategy at 
the following reform stages may result in multiple drawbacks and would require 
multiple corrections of the entire reform design.
Secondly, a significant level of centrality and directive management of the 
reforms is the characteristic of Russian e-Government implementation. The 
top-down approach was even embedded in the design of the reform. The ideas 
emanated from the federal center and were further adopted by the regions. 
There has been only limited opportunity for the subnational units to influence 
the progression of e-Government reforms. The initial inflexible approach did 
not propose cooptation strategies. Regions were given two options: to comply 
with the proposed solutions or to develop their own. This resulted in the emer-
gence of two separate e-Government platforms—federal and regional. 
Moreover, the municipal level of self-government has been completely disre-
garded in the initial plans.
Finally, we identify the resistance of the incumbent public administration 
system (what is called “digital feudalism” in the CSR GaaP Strategy) and clash 
of ideas within the ruling elites with regard to the ways in which e-Government 
should be implemented and what is its ultimate purpose. The former is deter-
mined by the natural lack of the initiative of existing bureaucracy to adhere to 
the notion that digitization improved administration by reducing its size and 
streamlining key policies. The idea of seamless government, coupled with the 
reduced control over exclusive policy domains, does not sit well in the self- 
determination of current public administration leaders. The latter can be 
crudely reduced to the ideological disagreement between Medvedev, who 
started planning for the Electronic Government, and Putin, under whose gov-
ernment it has mainly be implemented.
The transition to the GaaP model has further exposed the flaws of the tech-
nocratic approach, as the emphasis is made on functional and policy changes 
and lesser on the transformation of infrastructure. The latter becomes necessar-
ily distributed and uncontrollable from the single center. This undermines the 
entire top-down ideology of governance in Russia that critically modified the 
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course of the 2003–2013 public administration reform and significantly 
impacted the e-Government implementation at each development stage. The 
prolonged inability to adapt to the new principle of distributed and delegated 
governance over policy domains with blurred administrative boundaries will 
destine the new reform to follow the footsteps of its precursors.
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